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The Great Equalizer: Health Care Access 
and Infant Mortality in Thailand†
By Jonathan Gruber, Nathaniel Hendren, and Robert M. Townsend*
This paper analyzes Thailand’s 2001 healthcare reform, “30 Baht.” 
The program increased funding available to hospitals to care for 
the poor and reduced copays to 30 Baht (~$0.75). Our estimates 
suggest the supply-side funding of the program increased healthcare 
utilization, especially among the poor. Moreover, we find significant 
impacts on infant mortality. Prior to 30 Baht, poorer provinces had 
significantly higher infant mortality rates than richer provinces. 
After 30 Baht, this correlation evaporates to zero. The results suggest 
that increased access to healthcare among the poor can significantly 
reduce their infant mortality rates. (JEL H51, I12, I13, I14, I18, J13, 
O15)
In 2001, Thailand initiated the 30 Baht program, one of the largest, most ambitious health reforms ever undertaken in a developing country. The primary aim of this 
program was to reduce the long-standing geographical disparities in the provision 
of public healthcare in Thailand by dramatically increasing funding to provide for 
care to the poor. The program had two key features. First, the program replaced pre-
existing funding arrangements with a universal capitation payment of 1,200 Baht 
(~ $35) to provincial hospitals based on the number of people living in the province. 
Second, the program also sought to reduce the financial burden of health expenses. 
Therefore, out-of-pocket expenditures were replaced with a 30 Baht copay ($0.75) 
so that healthcare provision was primarily financed via the capitation payments to 
the hospital instead of user fees.
The 30 Baht program replaced two previously existing programs. First, roughly 
30 percent of the population were enrolled in the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) 
that theoretically provided free access to healthcare for the poor based on income 
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eligibility requirements. However, this program was significantly underfunded 
with reimbursements to public hospitals of roughly 250 Baht (~ $6) per enrollee 
per year (Damrongplasit and Melnick 2009; Donaldson, Pannarunothai, and 
Tangcharoensathien 1999). The MWS group was merged into the 30 Baht program 
and, as a result, the funding to hospitals to provide for their care increased fourfold 
to 1,200 Baht.1 Second, the previously uninsured, whose incomes were too high 
to qualify for the MWS program, (~ 50 percent of the population) saw a reduction 
in their cost of care to 30 Baht. Instead of receiving out of pocket payments, the 
hospital received a fixed capitation of 1,200 Baht to cover the cost of their care. In 
short, the policy made access to healthcare in public facilities independent of ones’ 
financial situation and led to an equalization of healthcare access for rich and poor.
We begin by investigating the impact of the 30 Baht reform on medical utiliza-
tion. Using data on inpatient utilization, we find that the program led to a moderate 
increase in healthcare utilization for the previously uninsured. However, we find 
a larger impact for those who were previously insured by the MWS program for 
the poor, for whom there was rising hospital reimbursement. The impacts for both 
groups are concentrated in public hospitals, which is consistent with the targeting 
of the funds. Moreover, for the previously uninsured we find evidence of a switch in 
utilization from private to public facilities, consistent with a response to the decrease 
in relative price of care in public versus private facilities induced by the 30 Baht 
program. Finally, we show that the increase in utilization for the MWS enrollees is 
especially large among infants and women aged 20–30.
We then turn our focus to infant mortality drawing on vital statistics records from 
the Ministry of Public Health. These contain information on the total number of 
births and deaths in each year within each province. Prior to 30 Baht, we docu-
ment a robust significant positive relationship between the fraction of a province 
that enrolled in the MWS program and the infant mortality rate; poor provinces 
had higher infant mortality rates. But, after the 30 Baht program, this correlation 
evaporates to a precisely estimated zero. We conduct a placebo test showing that 
the program does not lead to any reported change in the number of births, which 
suggests time-varying measurement error is not driving our results. Moreover, the 
evaporation of this relationship occurs precisely at the point of introduction of the 
30 Baht program, consistent with the increased access to medical care to the poor 
through the 30 Baht program driving the results.
This paper relates to several literatures. First, our paper builds on a large literature 
studying public health systems and the impact of health reforms in developing coun-
tries (Dow et al. 1997; Gertler 1998; Dow and Scmeer 2003; Thornton et al. 2010). 
Much of this literature focuses on the impact of lowering out-of-pocket healthcare 
costs (Dow et al. 1997; Dow and Scmeer 2003; Thornton et al. 2010). However, our 
results highlight the fundamental importance of the supply-side design of programs 
for the poor.2 Despite no change in the formal out-of-pocket price charged to the poor, 
the supply-side reforms led to large increases in utilization. In  contrast we find smaller 
1 The MWS enrollees were also waived of the 30 Baht fee so that they did not face an increase in the cost of care.
2 Our finding that the supply-side is important is qualitatively consistent with the depiction of rural healthcare 
provision in India in Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004).
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impacts on those whose out-of-pocket fees were reduced to 30 Baht. Heuristically, 
the supply side response mattered more than the demand side. Reducing the cost of 
medical care had less of an impact than providing extra money to hospitals. This sug-
gests the supply-side levers and reimbursement schemes are of first-order importance 
in designing health reforms. It also suggests doctors and hospitals in Thailand had the 
capability of limiting supply through nonprice mechanisms or rationing.3
Second, our paper builds on a large literature attempting to understand the rela-
tionship between income and infant mortality. Like many countries, infant mortality 
in Thailand has fallen over the past decades as economic development has increased 
(Vapattanawong et al. 2007). However, it is unclear whether this reduction is due 
to a direct result of the increased incomes versus the result of factors, like access 
to medical care, which are directly addressable through public policy. Exploiting 
the yearly frequency infant mortality vital statistics data, our results isolate the role 
of healthcare policy in preventing infant mortality. The results suggest healthcare 
policy can have large impacts and are consistent with other literature suggesting 
many infant deaths are quite preventable (Dupas 2011).
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we present background on the 
30 Baht program. Section II presents estimates of the impact of the program on 
healthcare utilization. Section III examines the impact of the program on infant 
mortality. Section IV concludes. We also provide several additional robustness tests 
in the online Appendix.
I. The Thai 30 Baht Program
A. Background
In 2001, Thailand became one of the first middle income countries to implement 
a universal health coverage scheme. The 30 Baht program was a primary component 
of the political platform of Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist leader who came to power 
in February 2001. The 30 Baht program had two key features. First, it provided uni-
versal access to care in public facilities for a cost (copay) of 30 Baht (~ $0.75) per 
visit. Second, it equalized the per-person funding available for healthcare in public 
hospitals: the program replaced preexisting public financing schemes with a fixed 
per capita budget of 1,200 Baht (~ $30) to each provincial public hospital system.4
The program began with several pilot provinces in early 2001, expanding to more 
pilots throughout the summer and covering all provinces by November 2001. In 
order to understand the potential impact of the program, it is important to understand 
what it replaced. Prior to the 30 Baht program, much of the relatively poorer popula-
tion enrolled in the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS). This program provided free 
care in public facilities for the poor, young (ages 1–15), and elderly (ages 60+).5 
3 It is often doctors, more so than patients, that choose treatment paths.
4 Public hospitals in Thailand are managed primarily at the provincial level. Each province has one major hos-
pital, along with numerous smaller hospitals (usually 1 per Amphoe/County) and clinics.
5 The program also covered the handicapped (all ages) and religious and community leaders. The definition 
for eligibility based on income (the relevant eligibility criteria for most members) was an income threshold of 
2,000 Baht per person or 2,800 Baht per household (~ $2.25/day).
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Prior to 30 Baht, this program was generally seen as underfunded, with a global 
 budget of only 250 Baht (~ $6) per enrollee per year (Donaldson, Pannarunothai, 
and Tangcharoensathien 1999). When the 30 Baht program began in 2001, MWS 
enrollees were automatically enrolled in the 30 Baht program, but waived of its 
30 Baht copay. As a result of absorbing this program into the 30 Baht program, 
funding to public hospitals to care for the poor increased from a global budget of 
250 Baht per enrollee to the 1,200 Baht per enrollee, a four-fold increase (~ $25). 
Thus, the 30 Baht program did not change the price faced by the poor in public facil-
ities (it was already zero). Rather, it addressed the supply side by increasing funding 
to public facilities with the intention of providing more healthcare to the poor.6
In addition to the 30 percent of the population covered by the MWS, about 20 per-
cent of the Thai population was enrolled in two employer-based insurance programs 
that were left largely untouched by the 30 Baht program. The Civil Servant Medical 
Beneficiary Scheme (CSMBS) provided free care to civil servants and their families in 
public facilities. The Social Security Scheme (SSS) provided free care to other formal 
sector workers (program was mandatory for formal sector employers). Because these 
programs were left unchanged around the introduction of 30 Baht, the combination 
of these two groups will provide a natural control group for portions of our analysis.7
The remaining 50 percent of the population was not covered under any of the 
aforementioned programs. However, they did have access to a previously existing 
government program, the 500 Baht program, which allowed households to obtain 
free care in public facilities for an upfront cost of 500 Baht per household per year. 
The central government matched the 500 Baht payment to the local hospital, so that 
total hospital revenues were 1,000 Baht per enrollee.8 About two-fifths of the unin-
sured (or 20 percent of the total population) took up this option.
Thus, for the previously uninsured (i.e., those not covered through their employer 
and those who do not qualify for MWS care) the 30 Baht program lowered the 
cost of public healthcare from a maximum of 500 Baht per household per year to 
30 Baht per disease (a cost reduction in the vast majority of cases). From the public 
hospital’s perspective the 30 Baht program replaced these out-of-pocket payments 
and 500 Baht payments (which were matched with an additional 500 Baht from the 
central government) with the 1,200 Baht per person capitation.
Figure 1 summarizes the three groups in the population and the way in which 
each was affected by the 30 Baht program. The UNINS faced a price reduction for 
care but also provided less revenue to hospitals. The MWS faced no change in the 
price of obtaining care, but the funding to hospitals significantly increased. The 
Control group (CSMBS and SSS) had no formal change to their programs around 
the introduction of 30 Baht.
6 In general, individuals were encouraged to go to their geographically local hospitals (to which the capitation 
funding was provided), and each person’s enrollment card listed the local hospital. However, individuals were 
allowed to use other hospitals outside their geographic region if they had a legitimate reason to do so (e.g., travel-
ing). In this case, the attended hospital could seek reimbursement from the patient’s home province.
7 A very small fraction (~1 percent) of the population, primarily upper class workers in Bangkok, has private 
insurance coverage. We exclude this group in our healthcare utilization analysis.
8 Not every service was free under the 500 Baht program or the 30 Baht program (e.g., dialysis was not covered 
in 2001). The set of covered procedures for 30 Baht was essentially the same set of procedures covered under the 
500 Baht and MWS programs.
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Summary of “Supply” and “Demand” Effects.—Since the 30 Baht program 
affected both the out-of-pocket payment requirements (“demand”) and the hospital 
funding arrangements by instituting capitated payments independent of utilization 
(“supply”), the net impact on utilization depends on how these two forces play out. 
For the previously uninsured, their reduction in out-of-pocket payments in public 
facilities should increase their demand. However, their supply of healthcare may be 
affected by the inability of hospitals to receive marginal payments for the provision 
of their care, instead receiving a capitation. Thus, whether their utilization increases 
or decreases depends on which force is stronger, supply or demand.
For the MWS, their out-of-pocket payment requirements never change. They were 
technically eligible for free care prior to and after the 30 Baht program. However, 
the willingness to supply such care may increase because the hospitals now receive 
a significant funding increase to provide care to this group. Thus, to the extent to 
which the funding increases the supply of care to the MWS, we expect their utiliza-
tion to increase.
II. Utilization Impact
A. Data and Sample
We begin our analysis of the 30 Baht program with its effects on inpatient utiliza-
tion. We focus on the impact on both the MWS population and a combined group 
of previously uninsured and 500 Baht users. Because their ex ante choice sets were 
identical, we pool the previously uninsured with the 500 Baht users for our analysis. 
Our primary empirical approach will consider a difference-in-differences estima-
tion that exploits the fact that the SSS and CSMBS programs were unaffected by 
the reforms.
Figure 1. Population Groups Impacted by 30 Baht
Group Description 30 Baht program impact Pop %
UNINS
(+500 Baht)
Either
•  Paid out-of-pocket or
•  Enrolled in 500 Baht program
•  Individuals face lower price of care
•  Hospitals receive 1,200 Baht capitation 
per person, replacing out-of-pocket 
payments or 1,000 Baht per household 
payment for 500 Baht program
50
MWS
Free care program in public facilities 
for poor, elderly (>60) and children 
(<15).
•  Increased hospital funding from 250 Baht 
to 1,200 Baht 30
CONTROL
Social Security Scheme (SSS)
•  Mandatory free care program for 
formal sector workers
Civil Servants (CSMBS)
•  Free care program for civil servants 
and their families
• No formal charge
20
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We use data from the Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) from years 2001 and 
2003–2005.9 This survey is a national cross section of all 76 Thai provinces, with 
roughly equal-sized samples from each province. In 2001, the survey is conducted 
in April/May, roughly 5 months before the beginning of the 30 Baht program in 
November. However, six provinces took part in a pilot study that was already under-
way in April/May of 2001. We therefore exclude these provinces in our analysis, 
since we do not have data prior to the introduction of the 30 Baht program for these 
provinces.10
The survey provides a wide range of health utilization and insurance coverage 
information. In particular, respondents are asked whether or not they have been 
admitted as an inpatient in the last 12 months, which will be our measure of uti-
lization.11 The survey also provides information on insurance status, including 
whether an individual was part of the MWS, SSS/CSMBS, or UNINS in 2001, and 
whether an individual was part of SSS/CSMBS or 30 Baht in 2003–2005. Although 
the survey is not a panel, it distinguishes between individuals enrolled in the free 
care (no copay) version of the 30 Baht program (i.e., the “roll-over” portion of the 
MWS) from those who must pay the 30 Baht copay (i.e., those who were previously 
enrolled in the MWS program). This allows us to classify individuals into the three 
groups (UNINS, MWS, CONTROL) in each year of the survey.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample, broken out by group. We 
provide the mean age, fraction female, and fraction employed (in any paying work, 
formal or informal) before and after the 30 Baht program began (i.e., 2001 versus 
2003–2005 in our sample). We also present the fraction of the sample each group 
represents both pre- and post-30 Baht.
In general, the means are similar, although not identical. The control group 
experiences a significant increase in age (~2 years), which is larger than the other 
groups (~1 year for MWS and UNINS). The fraction employed increases for the 
CONTROL and UNINS groups by about 2.5–3pp but less for the MWS (0.7pp). 
Gender shares remain virtually unchanged in each group over time. We will be able 
to control for these demographic variables in our regressions and assess the robust-
ness of our results to their inclusion or exclusion. In general, the relative sizes of 
each group remains qualitatively similar before versus after 30 Baht, although we 
do find evidence of a bit of an increase in the size of the CONTROL group (those 
obtaining insurance through their employer) relative to the other two groups.12
9 We thank our partners at the University Thai Chamber of Commerce for compiling and translating this survey 
into English.
10 An additional 15 provinces began a pilot study in June of 2001 but before the full implementation in November 
of 2001. However, the HWS was completed prior to the beginning of this pilot study in these 15 provinces, and thus 
we include these provinces in our analysis.
11 The surveys also provide information for outpatient utilization and the presence of sickness, however, the 
recall window changes from two weeks in 2001 to one month in years 2003–2005. Since this recall window changes 
over the same time period as the start of the 30 Baht program, we focus our results on inpatient utilization. In online 
Appendix A, we present the results for outpatient utilization.
12 Although this could be a result of the 30 Baht program, it is also consistent with the general economic growth 
in Thailand over this time period, as more people enter the formal labor force.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 97GRUBER ET AL.: THE GREAT EQUALIZER
B. Specification and Results
Table 2 presents the means of a 12-month inpatient utilization rate for the 
CONTROL, UNINS, and MWS groups, broken out separately, before and after the 
beginning of the 30 Baht program in 2001. The top row shows that overall inpatient 
utilization increased by 0.36pp, or roughly 5.4 percent over the pre-30 Baht utili-
zation rate of 6.65pp. Thus, the simple time series estimate suggests the 30 Baht 
program led to an increase in overall inpatient utilization.
Consistent with the aims of the program of expanding healthcare access to the 
poor, we find that the increase in overall utilization is primarily driven by an increase 
in utilization by the MWS group. The utilization rate for the MWS group increases 
from 0.0711 to 0.0792, a difference of 0.0081 ( p < 0.01). For the previously unin-
sured, we find a modest, yet statistically insignificant increase of 0.0021 (~3 percent 
of baseline utilization of 0.0585). Finally, we find no significant change for the con-
trol group (−0.0004), which is consistent with the fact that these programs were left 
intact around the introduction of the 30 Baht program.
The bottom two rows show the estimated difference in utilization between the 
treatment groups and the CONTROL group. The UNINS have lower utilization than 
the CONTROL group both before (−0.0207) and after (−0.0182) the introduction 
of 30 Baht. This implies a difference-in-differences estimate of 0.0025 ( p > 0.10), 
which suggests the 30 Baht program had a modest but statistically insignificant 
impact on inpatient utilization. For the MWS group, prior to 30 Baht, this group 
had significantly lower utilization rates than the CONTROL group (−0.0085). After 
30 Baht, the difference is positive and statistically insignificant (0.0003; p > 0.10). 
This implies a difference-in-differences estimate of 0.0088 ( p < 0.01), which 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Group Pre-30 Baht Post-30 Baht p-value (pre-post) p-value (D-in-D)
CONTROL
Age 35.8 37.7 0***
Female 0.530 0.528 0.57
Employed 0.682 0.711 0***
Percent of sample 0.201 0.226 0***
UNINSa
Age 32.5 33.4 0*** 0***
Female 0.523 0.526 0.12 0.204
Employed 0.631 0.657 0*** 0.662
Percent of sample 0.497 0.485 0.106
MWS
Age 29.7 30.5 0.021** 0.002***
Female 0.525 0.523 0.636 0.93
Employed 0.310 0.318 0.39 0.02**
Percent of sample 0.302 0.289 0.062*
Sample size 200,926 182,543
Notes: CONTROL = SSS + CSMBS members; UNINS = those not qualifying for CSMBS, SSS, or MWS. 
Standard errors clustered at the province level (70 provinces with data pre- and post-30 Baht).
 a Includes individuals who owned 500 Baht cards in 2001.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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implies that the 30 Baht program led to a 12 percent increase in utilization for the 
MWS group.13
The analysis heretofore has not included any controls for demographics, which 
are potentially important given the nonzero changes in sample composition outlined 
in Table 1. We estimate regressions of the form
(1) inpa t igt =  β  UNINS × UNIN S g × Post 3 0 t +  β  MWS MW S g × Post3 0 t 
 +  α t +  κ g +  X igt Γ +  ε igt ,
where subscripts i index individuals, g indexes insurance groups (e.g., UNINS, 
MWS, CONTROL), and t indexes year (2001, 2003, 2004, 2005). The variable 
inpa t igt is an indicator for inpatient utilization in the past 12 months,  α t is a year 
fixed effect,  κ g is a group fixed effect (MWS, UNINS, CONTROL), and  X igt is a 
set of demographic control variables including age deciles interacted with gender 
and 15 household income bins.14 The variables UNIN S g and MW S g are indicators 
for the previously uninsured and MWS group, and Post3 0 t is an indicator for years 
13 Because we focus on a relatively intensive measure of utilization (inpatient), one may wonder whether our 
results are picking up switching from less intensive (outpatient) outpatient utilization or a general increase in all 
forms of utilization. In online Appendix A, we present the results for the outpatient utilization, which changes the 
recall window from two weeks to one month in the post 30 Baht period. We show that the MWS group experiences 
a proportionally larger increase in outpatient utilization relative to the control group. Although we are concerned 
about issues of changing recall bias on the results, and thus do not include them in the main text, the results are 
consistent with the story that access to both inpatient and outpatient public healthcare was significantly expanded 
for the MWS.
14 One concern with including household income is that it may be a causal outcome of an increase in healthcare 
utilization. Our results do not change significantly with or without income controls.
Table 2—Inpatient Utilization (12 month)
Group Pre-30 Baht Post-30 Baht Difference
All groups 0.0664921 0.0701205 0.0036**
(0.0018886) (0.0023431) (0.0017)
CONTROL 0.0792515 0.07889 −0.0004
(0.0033922) (0.004141) (0.0027)
UNINS 0.0585472 0.0606406 0.0021
(0.0018215) (0.0021355) (0.0017)
MWS 0.0710707 0.0791735 0.0081***
(0.0023581) (0.0022474) (0.0027)
Difference
UNINS–CONTROL −0.0207*** −0.0182*** 0.0025
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0023)
MWS–CONTROL −0.0082** 0.0003 0.0085***
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0032)
Note: Standard errors clustered by province (70 provinces).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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2003–2005.15 The coefficient  β  UNINS and  β  MWS capture the difference-in-differences 
estimate of the impact of the program on the previously uninsured and the MWS 
group.
The results in Table 3 largely support the findings of the difference-in-differences 
specification of a large increase in utilization for the MWS, and a more modest 
effect on the previously uninsured. Our estimate of 0.0086 ( p < 0.01), an increase 
of 12 percent, for the MWS group in column I remains very similar to the results 
in Table 2. For the UNINS, we now estimate a slightly larger (and now statistically 
significant) increase in inpatient utilization of 0.0048 ( p < 0.05), an increase of 
8 percent over the baseline utilization rate of 0.0585 in 2001.
Column 2 adds province-by-year fixed effects that capture potential provincial-
level supply or demand shocks, such as the opening of a new private clinic or an 
outbreak of sickness. Since these fixed effects may be soaking up causal impacts of 
the program (e.g., a private clinic may be less likely to open because of the 30 Baht 
program), we do not include these controls in our primary specification. But it is 
reassuring that including these additional controls does not significantly affect our 
results. We estimate an increase of 0.0076 ( p < 0.05) for the MWS and 0.0044 
( p < 0.05) for the previously uninsured, statistically indistinguishable from our 
results without province-by-year fixed effects.
Private versus Public Utilization.—The 30 Baht program provided free care only 
in public, not private hospitals. Columns 3 and 4 present separate estimates for inpa-
tient utilization in public and private hospitals. Reassuringly, we find the increase 
15 We aggregate these post 30 Baht years for statistical power. Separate estimates by year are very similar but 
have wider standard errors.
Table 3—Inpatient Utilization (12 month)
Inpatient 
utilization
Inpatient 
utilization
Inpatient 
utilization 
(public)
Inpatient 
utilization 
(private)
Inpatient 
(women & child 
sample)
Inpatient
(nonwomen 
& child)
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual classification
UNINS × Post30 0.0049** 0.0045* 0.0069*** −0.0017* 0.0065 0.0053**
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0064) (0.0025)
MWS × Post30 0.0088*** 0.0078** 0.0083*** 0.0009 0.0216** 0.0087**
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0098) (0.0033)
Mean dep var (03–05) 0.0720 0.0720 0.0621 0.0096 0.1000 0.0689
Sample size (respondents) 383,469 383,469 383,469 383,469 40,834 342,635
Sample size (clusters) 70 70 70 70 70 70
Controls
Year FE X X X X X X
Group FE X X X X X X
Age, gender, income X X X X X X
Province FE X
Province × year FE X
Note: Standard errors clustered by province.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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in utilization for the MWS group is entirely concentrated in public utilization 
(0.0081, p < 0.01) as opposed to private utilization (0.0009, p > 0.10).
Moreover, this breakout reveals that the program led to a substitution of public for 
private utilization among the previously uninsured. We find an increase of 0.0068 
( p < 0.01) in public utilization and a decrease of −0.0017 ( p < 0.10) in private 
utilization. This is consistent with public options becoming relatively less expensive 
as a result of the 30 Baht program.
Women and Children.—In addition to analyzing the impact on each group as 
a whole, we can also analyze the impact for subgroups. Setting the stage for our 
subsequent focus on infant mortality, we focus on women aged 20–30 and infants 
aged 0–1. Column 5 presents results of the difference-in-differences specification 
restricted to a sample of only women aged 20–30 and infants. Column 6 presents 
the results from the complementary sample of those who are neither women aged 
20–30 or infants.
The results suggest that the 30 Baht program had a disproportionate impact on the 
utilization of women of childbearing age and infants, especially amongst the MWS 
group. In particular, among the MWS we find an increase of 0.0217 ( p < 0.05) for 
women aged 20–30 and infants, compared to an increase of 0.0085 ( p < 0.05) for 
the rest of the MWS group. We also find a larger increase among women aged 20–30 
and infants for the UNINS (0.0065 versus 0.0052), although the increase for women 
and children is not statistically significant (arguably due to the smaller sample size).
Summary.—In short, the utilization results are consistent with the aims of the 
program to increase access to medical care for the poor. We find modest increases in 
utilization for the UNINS, and a switch from private to public hospitals consistent 
with the demand increase resulting from the reduction in out-of-pocket payments 
required in public hospitals. However, our results suggest the largest impacts on the 
poor (MWS) population. Despite not facing any change in their out-of-pocket pay-
ment requirements, our results suggest the supply-side reforms of the program (and 
in particular the fourfold increase in funding) led to a significant increase in access 
to care for the poor. Moreover, we find especially large increases for women aged 
20–30 and children under one year old, motivating our subsequent analysis of the 
impact of the program on infant mortality.
III. Infant Mortality Specification and Results
A. Data Sources
We now turn to an analysis of the effect of the program on infant mortality. We 
draw on provincial-level vital statistics records compiled from death certificate reg-
istries, made available to us by the Thailand Ministry of Public Health for years 
1997 through 2008. Thailand has a relatively high-quality vital statistics registry, 
especially compared to other low- and middle-income countries (Setel et al. 2007). 
This makes it a well-suited environment for assessing the impact of the expansion 
of medical access to the poor on infant mortality. However, it is widely recognized 
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that vital statistics registries do not fully capture all infant mortality. Existing litera-
ture has documented underreporting of infant deaths in Thailand, especially among 
deaths occurring outside of hospitals (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2006).16 For the 
present analysis we ignore the potential impact underreporting, but in Section IIIC 
and online Appendix C we return to a detailed discussion of its potential impact on 
our results.
B. Vital Statistics Analysis
We begin with an analysis of the vital statistics records. Although our utilization 
data was at the individual level, the vital statistics records are only made available 
to us to the province-by-year level. To relate the infant mortality rate to the poten-
tial impact of the 30 Baht program, we use the HWS data to construct a variable 
FracMW S p equal to the fraction of a province enrolled in the MWS program in 
2001. Figure 2 plots the distribution of FracMW S p MWS , showing substantial variation 
with a standard deviation of 0.11, which reflects the unequal distribution of income 
across provinces.17
16 In the online Appendix, we present the summary statistics for the mean infant mortality rate in our sample for 
each year. These are fluctuating and slightly increasing over time and range from 6 and 7.3 in contrast to the World 
Bank Development Indicators, which suggest infant mortality rates closer to 15/1,000 in 2001 and 12/1,000 in 
2007 (World Bank 2001, 2007). We discuss the potential impact of time-varying measurement error in Section C1.
17 We also constructed a measure of the fraction in each province that falls in the UNINS category, FracUNINS. 
However, there is very little variation in the size of the control group across provinces; thus the correlation between 
FracUNIN S p and FracMW S p is −0.85. Since we only have 76 provinces, we do not have enough power to separate 
effects on the uninsured and MWS. We therefore analyze the relationship between the infant mortality rate and the 
fraction enrolled in the MWS program, FracMW S p , but will discuss the impact of not including FracUNIN S p on 
the interpretation of the results.
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Figure 2. Histogram of FracMWS in 2001 (Pre-30 Baht)
102 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS JANUARY 2014
We first document the historical pattern of infant mortality rates across provinces. 
We estimate separate regressions for each year t = 1997, … , 2008 of the form
 inf antmor t pt = a +  β t FracMWS FracMW S p 2001 +  ε pt ,
where inf antmor t pt is the one-year infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) in province 
p in year t. The coefficient  β t FracMWS captures cross-provincial the relationship 
between the fraction enrolled in the MWS program in 2001 and the infant mortality 
rate (in percent deaths per births) of the province in year t.
Figure 3 plots the coefficients,  β t FracMWS , for each year, along with their 95 per-
cent confidence interval. The cross-provincial relationship within Thailand prior to 
30 Baht exhibits a positive relationship between poorer areas (higher FracMWS) 
and higher infant mortality. However, after 30 Baht, this relationship evaporates. 
The coefficients for  β t FracMWS are near zero for every year after 30 Baht.18 This sug-
gests the 30 Baht program, and the dramatic increase in funding for the MWS pro-
gram removed the historical cross-provincial correlation between FracMWS and 
infant mortality.
Regression Specification.—We now turn to a regression specification given by
(2) inf antmor t pt =  β  Infant FracMW S p 2001 × Post 3 0 t + γ p +  α t +  ε pt .
We also include current and lagged provincial GDP levels as controls. Our primary 
specification focuses on a two-year window around the introduction of 30 Baht 
18 A joint test for all post 30 Baht coefficients equal to zero cannot be rejected at p = 0.10. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Fraction MWS on Infant Mortality
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(1999–2003) and excludes the year 2001 (since 30 Baht began in the middle of this 
year). We include year fixed effects and province fixed effects.
The coefficient  β Infant captures the equalizing force of the 30 Baht program. It 
measures how much the 30 Baht program reduced infant mortality in areas with a 
high fraction of MWS (i.e., poor) relative to those with a lower fraction of MWS. In 
online Appendix B, we show this measures the reduction in infant mortality on the 
MWS group under the assumption of no impact on the UNINS or control group.19 
In the absence of this assumption, the coefficient includes any spillovers on the non-
MWS in high versus low FracMWS provinces.
The results for  β  Infant are presented in Table 4. We estimate a significant coeffi-
cient of −0.0065 ( p < 0.01). This suggests that a 10 percent increase (~1sd) in the 
fraction enrolled in MWS prior to 30 Baht leads to a reduction in infant mortality of 
0.65 per 1,000 births.
The remaining columns show the robustness of the coefficient to alternative 
specifications. Column 2 removes controls for current and lagged provincial GDP. 
Column 3 contracts the analysis to a one-year window (2000–2002) and shows 
that the impact of the 30 Baht program remains quite stable. Column 4 expands the 
analysis to a four-year window (1997–2005) and column 5 adds province-specific 
linear trends. With province-specific linear trends in this expanded timeline, the 
coefficient increases slightly to −0.0082. This suggests our estimates are not driven 
by underlying heterogeneous geographical trends in infant mortality. Column 6 
estimates a median regression, as opposed to the standard mean regression, which 
19 If there is a positive effect of the program on the UNINS as well, then  β  Vital is an underestimate of the 
impact of the program on infant mortality of the MWS (because of the negative correlation between fracMWS and 
fracUNINS). Conversely, if there are spillovers onto the uninsured and control groups in areas with high MWS, 
then the coefficient captures the total average effect on all groups, but does not isolate the effect on the MWS group.
Table 4—Infant Mortality Rate (Provincial level vital statistics)
Infant mort.
(% of births)
Infant mort.
(% of births)
Infant mort.
(% of births)
Infant mort.
(% of births)
Infant mort.
(% of births)
Infant mort.
(% of births)
Births
(1,000s)
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FracMWS × Post30 −0.0065*** −0.0068*** −0.0054* −0.0054*** −0.0082*** −0.0076** −0.2426
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0032) (1.8170)
Specification
Year FE X X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X X X
Provincial GDP X X X X X
Prov. GDP (lagged) X X X X X
Province trends X
 (linear)
Median regression X
FracMWS X
Sample range 1999–2003 1999–2003 2000–2002 1997–2005 1997–2005 1999–2003 1999–2003
(excl. 2001) (excl. 2001) (excl. 2001) (excl. 2001) (excl. 2001) (excl. 2001) (excl. 2001)
Note: Standard errors clustered by province (76 provinces).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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is  generally more robust to the presence of outliers. We estimate a coefficient of 
−7.6486 ( p < 0.05) in the median regression specification, statistically indistin-
guishable from our estimate of −6.4512 in the mean regression.
C. Threats to Identification
Measurement Error.—It is of course a concern that infant mortality is under-
reported to the vital statistics registry.20 To address potential concerns, we conduct 
three analyses. First, one may be concerned that there was some other change in 
vital statistics recording around the introduction of 30 Baht or that the program 
increased general reporting of deaths and births. To test this, we ask whether the 
30 Baht program had any impact on recorded births in the vital statistics registry. 
Column 6 reports results from a regression of recorded births using our primary 
specification in equation (2). The results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of no relationship between the 30 Baht program and recorded births. This is reassur-
ing and suggests results are not driven by changes in vital statistics recording around 
the introduction of 30 Baht.
However, one may still be concerned that deaths may be differentially affected 
by reporting errors than births. Therefore, we consider the theoretical impact on 
our results of three potential sources of underreporting error. All of these forms of 
measurement error render our estimate a lower bound for the equalizing impact of 
the 30 Baht program on infant mortality.
First, suppose underreporting is a level effect, so that inf antmor t pt = ˆ infantmor t pt  +  a t , where  ˆ infantmor t pt  is the vital statistics report and  a t  > 0 is 
the underreporting level by year. In this case,  a t will be absorbed into the time fixed 
effect and will not introduce any bias into the estimates of  β  Infant . Second, suppose 
underreporting is proportional, so that inf antmor t pt = γ ×  ˆ inf antmor t pt  for some 
proportion γ > 1. In this case, each recorded infant death represents more than 1 
infant death, so that the estimate of 0.0065 is actually a lower bound of the true 
equalizing impact of the program. Third, suppose the 30 Baht program increases the 
reporting of infant mortality deaths, as may be expected because of the increase in 
hospital utilization and the higher propensity to report infant deaths if they occur in 
a hospital (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2006). Since utilization increases were largest 
among the MWS group, this type of measurement error would lead to an increase 
in reporting of MWS infant deaths under the 30 Baht program. This renders our 
estimate of 0.0065 a further understatement of the true  β  Infant .
In addition to this theoretical assessment, we also pursue all possible alterna-
tive measures of Thai infant mortality. To our knowledge, the only other national 
dataset containing infant mortality data in Thailand in this time period are the 2000 
census and the 2005–2006 Survey of Population Change. Each of these surveys 
asks summary birth histories: married women are asked how many children they 
have ever had, and how many of these children have died. Because these surveys do 
not ask about when these deaths occurred, they are not ideal for our analysis of a 
20 Our mean infant mortality rate in our sample is 6.5/1,000 births, which is less than imputed estimates used 
in the World Bank Development Indicators.
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 high-frequency impact of the 30 Baht program. Therefore, we present these results 
in the online Appendix, as opposed to the main text. Despite these concerns, in 
online Appendix C, we focus on a sample of women aged 25 and under and show 
that our results using the vital statistics are consistent with the results from these 
summary birth history data.
Other Thaksin Programs.—A remaining identification concern is that there 
was something else implemented in 2001, aside from the increased access to care 
associated with the 30 Baht program, that led to the relative reduction in infant 
mortality in high MWS versus low MWS provinces. Most notably, Thaksin came 
to power in 2001 under a populist, propoor platform. The 30 Baht program was 
the cornerstone of the healthcare policy, but Thaksin also implemented various 
economic policies to promote economic growth for the poor. In particular, the so-
called “Million Baht Fund,” analyzed in detail in Kaboski and Townsend (2009, 
2011), provided 1 million baht to each village for use in micro-loans. Yet these 
loan funds were provided uniformly across provinces, in contrast to the 30 Baht 
program, which led to a differential change in funding correlated with the fraction 
MWS in the province. Other concerns may simply be that Thaksin implemented 
other policies that led to economic expansion in poorer areas (i.e., with higher 
MWS). But, as shown in Table 4, our results are quite robust to the inclusion of 
current and lagged provincial-level GDP variables, suggesting that changing eco-
nomic conditions does not explain the sharp reduction in infant mortality around 
the introduction of the 30 Baht program. Thus, our results do not appear to be 
driven by other contemporaneous factors correlated with the fraction of MWS 
enrollees in each province.
D. Interpretation: Equalization versus Aggregate Reduction
Our results document a sharp equalization of infant mortality rates across 
provinces between 2000 and 2002, consistent with the increased access to care 
for the poor, leading to a reduction in their infant mortality rates. Our analysis 
relies on cross-sectional variation, and it allows for time-series changes in the 
infant mortality rate due to various within country factors, including time-vary-
ing changes in aggregate measurement error. As a result, we cannot extrapolate 
our analysis to an implied aggregate reduction in infant mortality without addi-
tional assumptions.
One natural assumption to make is that areas with no MWS (FracMWS = 0) 
have no change in infant mortality. Since the MWS comprise roughly 30–35 percent 
of the population, this implies an aggregate reduction in infant mortality of roughly 
2 per 1,000 births (30 percent × 6.5 = 1.95). This can be compared either to the 
World Development Indicators estimates of infant mortality rates of 15/1,000 in 
2000 (suggesting a national reduction of 13 percent) or to the vital statistics sample 
mean of 6.2/1,000 in 2000 (suggesting a national reduction of ~ 30 percent).
However, we are cautious to make strong claims about the implied impact on 
aggregate infant mortality. Indeed, there is no significant drop in the aggregate infant 
mortality rate in the vital statistics registries. To be sure, the expansion of healthcare 
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access and increase in services associated with the 30 Baht program could be driving 
an aggregate increase in reported infant mortality. However, our empirical analysis 
does not rule out the potential that the program led to an increase in infant mortality 
in richer areas that did not experience the large budgetary windfall from the 30 Baht 
program. However, there are two reasons to believe the equalization in infant mor-
tality did not come at the expense of infant mortality in richer areas. First, healthcare 
utilization increased across the country, including in richer areas. This suggests the 
supply of care did not contract in rich areas. Second, our casual interviews with doc-
tors and hospitals in richer areas of Thailand suggest they do not believe that the pro-
gram led to a significant decrease in the quality of their care provided or a significant 
rise in their infant mortality rates. In short, our empirical strategy robustly identifies 
an equalization of infant mortality rates across Thailand, consistent with the budget-
ary equalization of resources. This equalization represents suggestive evidence of a 
large aggregate reduction in infant mortality of 13–30 percent.
IV. Conclusion
Our results suggest that supply-side healthcare financing reforms can increase 
access to healthcare and combat infant mortality among the poor. Indeed, the sharp 
equalization in infant mortality observed between 2000 and 2002 is consistent with 
the fact that the most common causes of infant mortality in the world are from treat-
able diseases, such as dehydration (associated with diarrhea), pneumonia, and infec-
tion (Dupas 2011). Given the relatively large disparities in infant mortality that were 
reversed through the program, our results suggest that improved access to medical 
services could go a long way to improve the large disparities in infant mortality rates 
both across and within countries.
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